GERMAN VESTED INTERESTS RANKLED BY U.S. VIEW ON EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY

By Vladimir Socor, September 24, 2008

The Nord Stream pipeline will provide
natural gas [stolen by the] Russian
[government Mafia] to consumers
in Germany

According to German media reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Berlin has protested to the U.S. Embassy over an op-ed article by the U.S. Ambassador in Sweden, who criticized the Russo-German Nord Stream gas pipeline project on the Baltic seabed and other aspects of Russian energy policy in Europe. Some German politicians and interested business parties backed up the MFA’s unprecedented move against an American diplomat’s latitude to address German and European public policy concerns.

The most detailed report of the incident appears in the current issue of the German news magazine Der Spiegel (reportedly Europe’s top-circulation weekly), after the story had broken in other German media (Der Spiegel, September 22; Handelsblatt, Deutsche Welle, September 12). According to these accounts, the German MFA’s economic affairs division chief Rüdiger von Fritsch delivered a protest to U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission John Koenig in Berlin over the article published by U.S. Ambassador to Sweden Michael Wood, in the Stockholm daily Svenska Dagbladet. The German MFA expressed displeasure, asked for explanations, and wanted assurances that U.S. diplomats would refrain from such public expressions of their views on these issues.

German business figures such as Eggert Voscherau of BASF (the world’s largest chemical concern and a partner in the Gazprom-led Nord Stream consortium) and left-leaning politicians such as Martin Schulz (the Social Democrats’ leader in the European Parliament) in turn complained that the United States was now publicly opposing Nord Stream and in doing so was « destabilizing Europe. » Former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, the figurehead chairman of the Nord Stream consortium, portrayed Russia as a fully reliable energy supplier (despite ample evidence to the contrary in recent years) and dismissed the need for a diversification of Europe’s supplies. In the same breath, however, Schroeder echoed the Kremlin’s blackmail message: Russia does have the option to diversify energy exports to Asia, to Europe’s detriment, he told a large audience of German and Russian businessmen in Dresden on September 16. Two days later, Schroeder and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller visited Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Sochi to confer on the North Stream project and its public promotion. Even the Christian Democrats’ foreign policy spokesman in the Bundestag, Eckart von Klaeden (an Atlanticist uneasily toeing the party line on the Russian energy business) claimed that the Baltic seabed pipeline to Germany would not lead to one-sided dependence on Russia. Apparently, even the Christian Democrats do not consider a dependence level of more than 50 percent and projected to rise to be one-sided (International Herald Tribune, September 17; Bloomberg, September 18; Russian Television, Interfax, September 18; Der Spiegel, September 22).

U.S. Ambassador Wood’s op-ed article in Stockholm (Svenska Dagbladet, September 10), which triggered these German chain reactions, actually expresses views shared by many European analysts and editorialists, including German ones.
Indeed, the prevailing editorial opinion in Germany is at odds with the coalition government’s industry-driven policy to increase energy dependence on Russia. That op-ed should even have been music to the ears of ecologically-minded Germans (mainly but not only on the left), thanks to its strong endorsement of renewable clean energy sources, its emphasis on combating global warming, and its call on American investors to join Swedish and European ones in alternative energy projects.

German vested interests were, however, rankled by the article’s recommendations to Sweden and other countries to « take a hard look » at the Gazprom-led Nord Stream project’s adverse implications for energy security and to reduce Europe’s heavy dependence on Russian supplies of oil and gas.
Noting (in tune with other U.S. and some European officials) that Moscow uses the energy trade as a political instrument, Wood cautioned against easy acceptance of the Nord Stream, South Stream, and other Russian energy transport projects that are designed to bypass and isolate Western-friendly countries in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

In line with those countries’ aspirations and indeed with the declared U.S. policy, Wood urged Europeans to work with the energy producing and transit countries in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and the Black Sea region to develop direct transit routes, such as the Nabucco pipeline project, to European Union territory bypassing Russia. Wood cited Russia’s recent invasion of Georgia as a momentous event that underscores the need for reducing dependence on Russian energy supplies.

Given that Wood’s article is fully within the mainstream of European debates, as well as reflecting the known U.S. policy, the German MFA’s and other German reactions seem wholly disproportionate. The attempted overkill may seem designed to inhibit debate at the official level in Europe and apparently restrict a U.S. voice in that debate of all-European interest. The target, apparently, is not Wood but U.S. policy as such, which many Central and East European governments support within the EU.

According to Der Spiegel’s account, the U.S. embassy in Berlin responded by

« underscor[ing] that Washington does not comment on the private pipeline projects »

and that Wood’s article « may have been insufficiently screened in Washington. » Proponents of this argument, however, ignore the intergovernmental political nature of the Nord Stream and South Stream, as well as their function as part of Russia’s strategic policy in Europe.

http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_337crw7g2fx
http://pasta.cantbedone.org/pages/BdnfhL.htm
http://lnk.nu/209.85.135.104/p8h
United States Embassy Stockholm
Seeking Energy Alternatives

Svenska Dagbladet op-ed by
Ambassador Michael Wood

Wednesday, 10 September 2008

I have made alternative energy the focus on my tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Sweden.

For the past two years I have travelled to all 21 län visiting Swedish alternative energy companies.

I compiled information about these companies into a list, sometimes simply called the Ambassador’s List, which I have shared with American investors. At the end of September, I will unveil the latest version of the list, with more than 50 companies on it, at a meeting in New York City. My hope is that these great Swedish ideas can grow and spread through partnership with American investors, researchers and alternative energy companies.

I have emphasized alternative energy cooperation for two reasons. Like most Swedes and most Americans, I am concerned about global warming. We all recognize the danger posed by climate change and want to do something about it [Don't be ridiculous]. Alternative energy is key to any realistic solution to the climate challenge.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia brought into stark relief the other major reason why we need alternative energy: energy security. About 58 percent of the petroleum that we use in the U.S. is imported from foreign countries. We are dependent on other nations for more than half of our oil needs. Dependence on foreign sources is not a great problem if the sources are diversified. The U.S. gets its oil from North America (Canada, Mexico), the Middle East (Saudi Arabia), Africa (Nigeria) and South America (Venezuela). Europe, however, is at risk because it relies too much on one unreliable energy supplier: Russia.

Five European Union members are wholly dependent on Russia for their natural gas, and four more receive more than 50 percent of their natural gas from Russia. One third of all EU oil imports come from Russia. And we know that Russia will not hesitate to use energy as a weapon. On New Year’s Day 2006, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to and through Ukraine because of a contract dispute. About 80 percent of the natural gas Europe imports from Russia passes across Ukraine, so the effects were felt not just in Ukraine, but as far away as Italy. In May 2007, Russia cut off delivery of oil products and coal to Estonia because the Estonian government decided to move a monument to the Red Army to a less prominent location.

Sweden is less vulnerable to energy threats than many European countries. Hydropower and nuclear energy provide for almost all of Sweden’s electricity needs. Oil is imported for transportation, but as ethanol vehicles and electric hybrids become more common, oil imports should become relatively less important. Overall, 36 percent of Sweden’s energy needs are met from foreign sources, compared to about 50 percent for the EU 27 as a whole.

Starting from this position of relative energy independence, Sweden can be a leader in efforts to reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies.

Europe needs to unite and speak with one voice on energy, not allowing Russia to sow differences between European states as it has often done in the energy arena. In the EU Summit Declaration on Georgia on September 1 there was a brief statement that indicates that European leaders understand their difficult situation:

« Recent events illustrate the need for Europe to intensify its efforts with regard to the security of energy supplies. »

There two primary ways to do this:

First, keep developing alternative fuels. Ethanol instead of gasoline, biogas instead of natural gas, solar and wind power instead of coal; all of these steps will reduce dependence on imported oil and natural gas while also cutting carbon emissions. Sweden leads the world in alternative energy technology. I will continue my efforts to create lasting linkages between energy innovators in the U.S. and Sweden. [Pure pandering for pure waste]

Second, develop alternative fuel routes. Europe needs to work with the energy producing and transit countries in Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to develop an energy infrastructure outside the Kremlin’s control. Russia’s invasion of Georgia shattered one of Europe’s fastest-growing economies. It was also a significant setback to the Nabucco pipeline project.

The European Parliament and the Council of Europe initiated Nabucco in 2003. This pipeline and another new project, the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline, will when completed bring natural gas from the Caspian Sea through Georgia to Turkey and then into the heart of Europe. It represents a non-Russian supply of natural gas passing from the exporting countries directly to Europe without crossing Russian territory. Needless to say, this would reduce Russia’s ability to cut off natural gas to Europe as it did in 2006 and 2007.

On the other hand, one energy pipeline that should be reexamined is the South Stream project, which may not be in Europe’s overall interests. South Stream, a natural gas pipeline that will be firmly in Russian control, will not do much to provide new energy supplies to Europe. The principal goal is simply to cut Ukraine out of a portion of the natural gas distribution system. This is a time for Europe to bolster Ukraine, not undermine it.

Closer to home, Sweden should also take a hard look at Nord Stream, the proposed natural gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea to bring more Russian natural gas to Germany. Nord Stream bypasses the Baltic States and Poland, potential consumers, and represents a special arrangement between Germany and Russia. The EU should be speaking with a single voice to counteract the power of Russia’s energy weapon.

The economies of the United States and Europe are going to depend on imported oil and natural gas for many years to come. We need to recognize the threat posed by this dependence and take steps to counter it. On September 11 and 12, top energy experts from the United States, Sweden and the rest of Europe will meet in Stockholm for an extraordinary Transatlantic Energy Security Dialogue. This gathering underscores the heightened concern about European energy supplies following Russia’s aggression against Georgia. We must create alternative forms of energy, and we must establish new ways to get the imports that we can’t, for the moment, do without.

Embassy of the United States of America
Dag Hammarskjölds Väg 31, SE-115 89 Stockholm
webmaster@usemb.se

La Grandeur, toujours l’obsession de la grandeur, le possède

La situation actuelle de la Russie poutinienne me fait penser au grand méchant loup et aux trois petits cochons. Le loup n’a pas eu trop de mal à balayer les maisons de paille et de branchages, mais il est voué à se casser le nez sur la maison de brique.
Comme l’écrivait le « Wall Street Journal » du 17 septembre, la chute de 55% enregistrée par la Bourse de Moscou depuis quatre mois, « c’est la facture de huit ans de poutinisme qui est présentée au paiement ». Cela tient à la fois de l’invasion de la Géorgie, où s’est manifesté, même aux plus obtus, le sens de la politique étrangère russe, et à la chute des cours du pétrole : à 150 dollars le baril, Poutine est riche ; à 95 dollars, sa position est branlante.

Le régime a utilisé les sommes gigantesques, dégagées par les exportations d’hydrocarbures, pour engager des dépenses inconsidérées en matière d’urbanisme de prestige et d’immobilier de luxe à Moscou et à Saint Petersburg, villes-façades du village à la Potemkine, de dépenses somptuaires à l’usage des oligarques, de matériels de défense, de la reconstruction d’un Etat de contrôle et de répression. Des « plans » utopiques de redéveloppement de la Sibérie avalent les fonds sans créer de rapport présent ou avenir.
Tous ces débours ont été décidés en projetant des prix très élevés pour le pétrole et le gaz naturel. Les recettes engrangées pour chaque baril de pétrole et chaque mètre cube de gaz ayant baissé de près de 40 pour cent, la Russie est surengagée, même en prenant en compte les quelques cinq cent milliards de dollars de réserves monétaires que lui a valu l’orgie des prix surévalués.

Le capital international investi à la Bourse de Moscou s’est enfui – 35 milliards de dollars ont joué la fille de l’air après l’invasion de la Géorgie ; les banques russes, auparavant assises sur la bulle pétrolière, ont été fragilisées par la fuite des capitaux. Pour se refinancer, elles doivent désormais payer une prime de risque qui reflète les incertitudes pesant sur les comptes et l’économie russes : à risque élevé, prime d’emprunt aggravée.

Confronté à une crise de confiance qui secoue les banques russes, le gouvernement a dû renflouer le système – à la différence du plan de renflouement proposé par le gouvernement américain pour faire face aux troubles du marché financier et hypothécaire, le système russe ne s’appuie pas, lui, sur une économie non-énergétique puissante et diversifiée, mais uniquement sur la rente qu’il touche sur les ventes de matières premières. En d’autres termes, le gouvernement russe continue de gaspiller cette rente : auparavant c’était pour la « grandeur » de la Russie, aujourd’hui, c’est pour éviter une débâcle [1]. L’inflation cette année atteindrait les 15 pour cent.

Le climat de l’investissement est à la tempête. L’Etat a renationalisé des branches entières de l’économie, et largement étendu sa sphère de contrôle (les entreprises d’Etat étant les plus corrompues et les moins efficaces, voilà qui n’aide pas la prospérité).

L’affaire BP-TNK est l’exemple même de la politique poutinienne : la société pétrolière britannique a été purement et simplement spoliée de son investissement, ses cadres dirigeants expulsés de Russie après une campagne de terreur fiscale, policière et « judiciaire » orchestrée par le Kremlin. Pour un pays qui dépend des technologies occidentales pour son industrie pétrolière, le bilan est désastreux, quoique Poutine & Compagnie se haussent du col pour célébrer ce genre de victoire. Dans la même veine, Poutine a proféré en public des menaces contre le patron de la firme sidérurgique Mechel, dont les actions ont baissé de moitié le lendemain.

Les problèmes de l’économie et de la société sont suraigus. Rien ne reflète mieux la crise d’une société que sa démographie. Pour résumer, mentionnons que le taux de mortalité infantile – l’un des plus expressifs de la réalité d’une nation – se situe officiellement à 10,81 pour mille, à égalité avec l’Arabie saoudite. Le taux de natalité se monte à 11,03 pour mille, ce qui place la Russie au 176ème rang mondial, alors que son taux de mortalité est le 18ème du monde, à 16,6 pour mille. Au niveau du Tchad, du Mali de la Somalie et du Nigéria ! L’excédent des décès sur les naissances est énorme, puisqu’il dépasse les cinq et demi pour mille : depuis près de vingt ans, le déficit annuel se monte à 700 à 800 000 individus par an !

La crise démographique est profonde et convulsive : le Russe est une espèce en voie de disparition ; la proportion de musulmans, Tatares, peuples du Caucase, etc., si importante pour un pays passionnément collé à sa « slavitude », est de plus en plus élevée. La Russie, naguère peuplée de 150 millions d’habitants, évolue rapidement vers les 100 millions.

Les causes de la surmortalité sont bien connues : alcoolisme systématique, avec ses conséquences génétiques et sanitaires, tabagisme incontrôlé ; médecine du tiers-monde, très faible accès aux soins, qualité misérable du personnel médical, manque de médicaments et d’hygiène élémentaire dans les hôpitaux. Explosion des maladies cardio-vasculaires, faiblesse de la médecine préventive et du traitement des maladies dégénératives. SIDA bien plus développé que ne le laissent croire les chiffres officiels.

http://larussophobe.wordpress.com/2008/08/11/special-extra-%E2%80%94-editorial-the-facts-on-georgia/

EDITORIAL

The Facts on Georgia

La Russophobe, 11 August 2008

As the propaganda spewing out of the Kremlin reaches a feverish pitch, we take a moment to remind our readers of the basic facts concerning Russia’s barbaric actions in recent days and the recent history that lies behind them.

In August 2007, a Russian attack plane fired a missile into Georgian territory; it didn’t explode, and Georgia recovered the remains. Russia refused to take responsibility for the act, and the international community did not demand it. Georgia allowed the incident to pass without military response.

Russian military forces were gathering near Georgia as radical separatist groups in its South Ossetia region were organizing to try to break free of Georgian rule. In mid April of this year, the Putin regime gave official recognition to various documents issued by the separatists calling for cooperation with Moscow, and the Russian military presence was meant to intimidate the Georgians and prevent them from using force to crush the rebellion. Again, Georgia declined military force.

A few days later, as the elected government in Tbilisi began agitating internationally against Russia’s activities, a Russian MiG fighter jet flew into Georgian air space and shot down an unmanned Georgian reconnaissance plane. In May, the government won a resounding vote of confidence in parliamentary elections that were judged free and fair by international observers. In June, an independent UN investigation confirmed that Russia had committed an act of war against Georgia. As Georgia began to agitate vigorously for NATO membership, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened:

“We told the Georgians that their desire to join NATO will not help solve the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it will lead to renewed bloodshed.”

In January, an overwhelming majority of Georgians had voted to join NATO. Pavel Felgenhauer of the Jamestown Foundation wrote:

There is no hope in Moscow that any anti-NATO pro-Russian forces may come to power in Tbilisi, and military action in support of separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is being seriously contemplated (see EDM, June 12). The Russian Foreign Ministry has officially announced that Moscow refuses to discuss with Tbilisi the legality of the deployment of additional troops and armaments in Abkhazia, because the troops “prevented a Georgian blitzkrieg”

(www.mid.ru, June 17). When substantial talks are essentially stopped while additional troops are deployed, it’s more than just a threat of the use of force.

Two weeks later, NATO was warning Russia of its concerns about a massive troop buildup on Georgia’s borders, which looked for all the world like Russia was preparing to invade. Georgia still took no military action against Ossetia or Russia.

In July, ignoring NATO’s concerns, Russia openly began flying attack aircraft through Georgian airspace. Simultaneously, there was an attempt to assassinate the leading pro-Georgia leader in Ossetia [Dmitry Sanakoyev]. Georgia protested and recalled its ambassador from Moscow for consultations, but took no military action. Vladimir Socor of the Jamestown Foundation wrote:

“Russia has practically ceased to recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity and internationally recognized borders, and is using force to underscore this fact. International organizations are as usual behind the curve in taking note of this development and drawing the conclusions from it.”

An editorial in the Financial Times stated that “the US and the European Union must not accept” Russia’s belicose actions and concluded:

“Moscow is very interested in stopping Georgia developing as a pro-west state – and blocking its bid to join Nato. The west must be equally determined to help Tbilisi follow its chosen course.”

On August 6th Socor reported that

“heavily armed proxy troops opened fire on Georgian villages, while the secessionist authorities refused to talk with Tbilisi.”

The attacks escalated. Socor states:

“The attacking forces began destroying the transmission antennae of Georgian mobile telephone systems. Arms and paramilitary groups poured in from Russia to South Ossetia through the Russian-controlled Roki tunnel. Russian officials in Georgia claimed that the attacking forces were out of Russia’s control. Officials in Moscow, meanwhile, justified the attacks directly and indirectly by accusing Georgia of aggression.”

This is what happened next, according to Socor:

At 7:00 P.M. local time on August 7, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke live on national television, announcing a unilateral ceasefire and asking the other side also to cease hostilities. In highly conciliatory words, Saakashvili called for talks “in any format”; reaffirmed the long-standing offer of full autonomy for South Ossetia; proposed that Russia should guarantee that solution; offered a general amnesty; and pleaded for international intercession to stop the hostilities (Rustavi-2 TV, August 7).

Following Saakashvili’s address, attacks on Georgian villages intensified. The village of Avnevi was almost completely destroyed, Tamarasheni and Prisi shelled, and the police station in Kurta, seat of the Sanakoyev administration, smashed by artillery fire. Civilians began fleeing the villages.

These attacks forced Tbilisi to take defensive action. By 10:30 P.M. local time on August 7 the Georgians returned fire. During the night, Georgian forces including armored columns began advancing toward Tskhinvali, the secessionist authorities’ administrative center.

In response, Russian forces crossed the Georgian border in strength and attacked the Georgians, driving them out of Ossetia and following them into Georgia proper. Civilian apartment buildings in the nearby city of Gori were bombed and Russians also bombed the civilian airport outside the national capital of Tbilisi. Russian forces also moved into Abkhazia, another breakaway region of Georgia where no force at all had been used by Georgia, clearingly indicating that Russia was not acting in response to Georgian provocation. When Georgia asked for a ceasefire, the Russians ignored the demand, and they are still prosecuting war in Georgia at this very moment.

These are the facts, and they are well understood by the world’s nations. Not one of them, not a single one, has expressed support for Russia’s barbarism. It is perfectly clear that Russia undertook a persistent series of actions designed to provoke Georgia into defending its territory, and gathered troops anticipating an retaliatory invasion of conquest. Over and over, Georgia declined military action, until Russia’s provocation became so gross and outragous that there was no alternative but to respond. And now all that has in fact occurred.

President Bush put it this way:

“The Russian government must respect Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.”

He said that Russia’s actions were ““unacceptable in the 21st century” and had “substantially damaged Russia’s standing in the world,” as well as harmed relations between Washington and Moscow.

Russia stands alone, covered in blood, inviting another apocalypse. Twice in the past century Russia’s society has collapsed. Now, we see the beginnings of yet a third collapse, and perhaps this time a fatal one. The Kremlin is lying brazenly to its own people about these events, and can do so freely because there is no opposition political party and the Kremlin owns all the TV stations. This is precisely what occurred when Russia crushed the nations of Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II, including the infamous massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn forest. Russia also had many reasons then why it was “their fault” and not Russia’s. They were just as empty then as they are now.

Welcome back to the USSR!

http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_282hrnv3zd6
http://pasta.cantbedone.org/pages/oVJUsd.htm
http://larussophobe.wordpress.com/2008/08/19/felgenhauer-on-georgia/
Felgenhauer on Georgia
La Russophobe, 19 August 2008

The brilliant Pavel Felgenhauer, writing in Novaya Gazeta and translated by Robert Amsterdam

Today it is perfectly obvious to me that the Russian incursion into Georgia was planned in advance; moreover, the final political decision to complete preparation and start the war in August was, it would seem, taken already in April.

And the Ossetians intentionally provoked the Georgians, and any kind of response, tough or mild, would have been used as an excuse to attack. And if the Georgians had endured without complaining, then the Abkhazians would have begun, like they now do, a long-prepared operation for the «mopping up» of the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. If a war has been planned, an excuse will always be found.

Towards August, a significant part of the Black Sea Fleet ships was ready for a lengthy battle sortie, units of constant readiness of the Land forces, the paratroopers and the marine infantry were ready to move, while during the « Caucasus-2008 » exercise, which ended on 2 August, a week before the war, the Air force, the Navy and the Army completed their last readiness inspection on a locality at the Georgian border.

Concurrently, towards the beginning of August, the Railroad troops in Abkhazia completed repair of railroads, along which tanks were moved to Inguri this week, while heavy equipment and supplies for an approximately 10-thousand-strong unit, intruded into Western Georgia without any excuse or formal reason. Naturally they didn’t use the hastily repaired railroad for any «national-economic aims», as Moscow had officially declared,

The state propaganda apparatus likewise carried out preparations, working on the population under control with constant reports about an inevitable Georgian attack and about how the USA and the West –for whom this conflict was absolutely unneeded, were standing behind all of this.

Naturally, one can not endlessly hold troops and the fleet at 24-hour advance readiness. In October the weather would worsen, snow would close the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. Therefore the second half of August was the deadline for starting a full-scale war with Georgia.

At the Bucharest NATO summit in April, where Putin took part personally, it became clear that the accession of Georgia and Ukraine to the alliance, although for the moment the decision was deferred, was unavoidable.

Russian civilian and military leaders openly warned both the West and the authorities in Tbilisi and Kiev that attempts to «drag into NATO» (in the words of our diplomats) countries that Moscows considers to be its traditional property would lead to a crisis. It was declared that Russia would prevent « by any means » the entry of Georgia into NATO, but this did not have any effect on Mikheil Saakashvili.

Then events started to develop at an accelerated pace.

Putin entrusted the government with «elaborating measures with respect to the provision of targeted assistance» to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which legally meant a denial of Georgia’s state sovereignty.

Then, a Russian fighter shot down a Georgian drone over Abkhazia. Combat units with heavy attack weaponry were introduced into Abkhazia under the guise of peacekeepers, and later railroad troops. Then followed a series of manoeuvres, incursions of Russian combat airplanes into the Georgian airspace, a factual rejection of a diplomatic settlement to the conflict under contrived pretexts and finally the war, which was supposed to liberate Abkhazia and South Ossetia once and for all of any Georgian population, Tbilisi of Saakashvili, and the Trans-Caucasus of NATO and the Americans.

In principle Moscow is even prepared formally to preserve the territorial integrity of Georgia in a form of a kind of confederation and to give the Georgians the opportunity to democratically elect themselves as president anybody whom, preferably, they will approve in Moscow as well.

That is precisely the same way the Russian leadership prepared in ’99 the incursion into Chechnya. Then already in early spring, according to the testimony of former premier Sergey Stepashin, a decision on principle was adopted to start the war in August-September. All the summer was spent on engineering works and other preparations for the deployment of shock troops. Putin and his team were then restoring the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation; today, it seems, they have taken to getting the post-Soviet space in line.

In ’99 the incursion of Chechen fighters into Daghestan had been the excuse for war, but its unexpected initial success led to a crisis and to the replacement of Stepashin with Putin.

Today the unexpectedly mighty strike by Saakashvili – the instantaneous rout of Ossetian formations – also seriously messed up the cards.

Moscow could no longer pretend that it was merely the brave Ossetians slugging it out with the Saakashvili regime, while our side was merely attempting to keep the sides separated, establish peace and that was the only reason for it to introduce troops.

It became necessary to start an overt invasion, bear losses and subject oneself to western pressure, unbearable for the Russian bureaucracy, integrated into the world financial system.

It became necessary to throw the troops into combat in relatively small detachments. Enormous traffic jams arose in the Roki Tunnel (6 km in length), which due to its narrowness can only be used for one-way alternate traffic, on the road to Java and to Tskhinvali. The outdated, dilapidated Russian equipment was constantly breaking down. The evacuation of the wounded and civilians, the approach of volunteers absolutely not needed in the given situation – all led to an enormous logistics crisis, which is continuing today, while the relatively small vanguard forces had to be thrown into combat on a just-in-time unit by unit basis.

The elite units, including air-landing forces spetsnaz, pulled forward towards Tskhinvali on 8 August, for nearly two days could not dislodge the Georgians from the city, despite the massive use of artillery, tanks and combat aviation. The Georgians even wounded general Anatoly Khrylev, the commander of the 58th army, who had come to the vanguard to establish order.

The Georgian regular troops only left Tskhinvali on the orders of their political leadership. Deputy chief of the General staff Anatly Nogovitsyn confessed that the armed forces of Georgia are different from those who 15 years ago lost the war to the separatists:

«In the present moment this is a modern, well mobilized grouping, outfitted with modern weaponry».

After cleaving Tskhinvali, the Georgian troops continued their retreat. By the 11 of August almost the entire army was concentrated around Tbilisi.

By that time on the territory of Georgia, including Ossetia and Abkhazia, up to 20 000 of our soldiers had invaded. The vanguard detachments reached Gori, occupied Zugdidi, entered Senaki and demolished a Georgian military base there.

Vanguard intelligence entered the city-port Poti. Georgian troops were retreating nearly everywhere, not engaging in combat.

Russian troops got far away from their bases of supply, there are too few of them for a successful occupation, their movements through Georgia lost meaning and only led to further losses in equipment due to constant breakdowns.

Having ordered a retreat, the Georgian leadership saved the regular army, which with its lightning rout of the Ossetians has elevated its prestige in society.

Having saved the army, Saakashvili preserved, as it seems to him, a united Georgia and simultaneously the foundation of his own regime, while he left the task of dealing with the Russian incursion to western leaders and diplomats.

In all of its history the Georgian people has lived at the crossroads of warring world empires and has learned a flexibility in matters of survival and an ability to use one strong opponent against another that is beyond our wildest dreams. Some of today’s Russian leaders only fancy themselves acting like Stalin.

The demolished military bases and diverse infrastructure will be restored with western money, and in the process new jobs will appear as well. The smashed radars and weaponry will be replaced with newer and better ones.

In so doing, Saakashvili has successfully solved his main strategic task – he has internationalized the Ossetian and Abkhazian problems once and for all, which in the end may result in the gradual displacement of Russia and reduction of its influence in the region.

Already at the end of June in Tbilisi the French ambassador in Georgia Eric Fournier was declaring in the presence of a «Novaya Gazeta» correspondent:

« The international community does not consider Abkhazia and Ossetia a serious problem. We have Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq. Nobody in Brussels regards the possibility of deploying international peacekeeping forces in the region. In any case, the EU does not have spare soldiers for such a little-important question.

This is altogether the affair of the Russians, Russia is the key player in the region ».

Now all has cardinally changed, the Russian incursion has roused Europe.

President of France Nicolas Sarkozy has advanced a peace plan, coordinated with NATO allies and with Japan, which envisages an unconditional cease-fire, the return of all refugees, including to Abkhazia, the full withdrawal of Russian and Georgian troops from the zones of conflict and the introduction of international peacekeeping forces, who will likewise include a Russian contingent.

The previous format of exclusive Russian peacekeeping is now completely unacceptable to the West, our aggression has crossed everything out.

For simple people in the Caucasus, for Ossetians, Georgians, Abkhazians and others such an outcome means real peace, security, huge foreign assistance for the restoration and development of the region. For Russia this can signify a military-political defeat as the result of an apparently successful invasion.

It is understandable that the French plan was rejected out of hand as unacceptable by our ambassador in the UN Vitaly Churkin, but then Moscow began to maneuver. Today’s Russia, dependent on the West, can speak a lot about its resurgent might, but in practice things turn out to be a bit different.

The problem is not only that the old equipment is constantly breaking down, while the Georgians are busy knocking down our supersonic strategic bombers. All of the Russian leaders, both from the faction of the «siloviki», and the «liberals» – are in essence businessmen-billionaires, their personal interests are linked to the West, with stock market quotes, their main political goal – the «modernization of Russia», while the incursion into Georgia is ravaging all of them today and clearly threatens even greater unpleasantnesses in the future.

Retaining the possibility of the integration of Russia with the West, on Tuesday president Dmitry Medevedev declared «about cessation of the operation with respect to imposing peace in South Ossetia». In the words of Nogovitsin, this signifies cease-fire.

But nothing yet is finished. In Moscow they are still hoping to depose Saakashvili, although this is unlikely to happen, and any successor of his, for example the exile Irakli Okruashvili, with whom Saakashvili has publicly made peace, will be no better.

The conflict is complicated, apparently, by the personal strong enmity between Saakashvili and Putin. In diplomatic and political circles in Tbilisi there is talk about how Saakashvili responded disparagingly about « the Kremlinites » in front of witnesses. In a personal meeting Saakashvili told me for the record that he had heard about these rumors, but he himself had never said anything like this, and « all of this is provocations by the Russian special services».

It is insufferable to come to terms with the fact that the hated Saakashvili, who has taken Georgia out of the CIS, has officially declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia occupied territories, and with whom our leaders cannot compete in public street politics, nevertheless remains in power in Tbilisi.

Circles around the Kremlin are demanding the creation of a special international tribunal on crimes in the Caucasus. («Novaya gazeta», by the way, considers this an imperative, under the condition that the investigation touches upon all sides of the conflict. – P.F.) However, even if such a tribunal were suddenly to be created, although the International criminal court already exists for dealing with war crimes, then its jurisdiction would extend to the Russian military-political leadership as well, which can in first order find itself under fire for their previous dealings in Northern Caucasus and for the current ones.

Once established, the International tribunal would not depend on Russian power, but would be subject to law.

According to the testimony of eyewitnesses, onto the territory of Georgia has been introduced through the Roki Tunnel a rocket brigade of the 58th army – «Uragan» systems of multiple rocket launchers (RSZO) «Uragan» and «Tochka-U».

«Grad» RSZO systems (122 mm caliber) are extremely inefficient for strikes on cities and entrenched troops, in contrast to the significantly more powerful «Uragan» (220 mm). From the Tskhinvali rayon the «Tochka-U» can hit Tbilisi and the surrounding rayons. The high-explosive-fragmentary warhead of the «Tochka-U» ‑ the cartridge type 7 ‑ covers three hectares.

The «Uragan» RSZO and the «Tochka-U» rockets were massively used for the bombardment of Chechnya in the years 1999 and 2000, which led to the massive deaths of peaceful inhabitants and demolition.

Last week, targets in Western Georgia were pelted from Abkhazia with «Tochka-U» rockets: the launches were registered by the American global system for monitoring missile launches. The Abkhazian powers declared that it was they who had produced the launches of the artillery rockets.

Now our side can likewise assert that it is the Ossetians (and not the 58th army) who are delivering strikes against Tbilisi in revenge, supposedly for Tskhinvali. Such strikes, without a doubt, will create in Tbilisi a frightened panic, and perhaps it will still be possible to succeed in overthrowing Saakashvili’s regime.

The cease-fire will be very shaky until that moment when foreign peacekeeping contingents enter Georgia.