Posté le Mardi 26 août 2008 par Sittingbull
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Russia Is Dangerous But Weak
August 26, 2008
‘In Russia,” wrote the great scholar of Russian imperialism Dietrich Geyer many years ago, “expansion was an expression of economic weakness, not exuberant strength.”
Keep this observation in mind as Vladimir Putin and his minions bask in the glow of Western magazine cover stories about Russia’s “resurgence” following its splendid little war against plucky little Georgia. The Kremlin is certainly confident these days, buoyed by years of rising commodity prices and a bullying foreign policy that mistakes fear for respect — the very combination that made the Soviet Union seem invincible in the 1970s.
But the Soviet Union wasn’t invincible. And here’s a crazy thought: The same laws of social, economic and geopolitical gravity that applied in Brezhnev’s U.S.S.R. apply equally in Mr. Putin’s KGB state.
Take something as basic as demography. “In the next four decades,” noted CIA Director Michael Hayden earlier this year, “we expect . . . the population of Russia to shrink by 32 million people [to about 110 million]. That means Russia will lose about a quarter of its population. To sustain its economy, Russia increasingly will have to look elsewhere for workers. Some of them will be immigrant Russians coming from the former Soviet states, what the Russians call the near abroad. But there aren’t enough of them to make up that population loss. Others will be Chinese and non-Russians from the Caucasus, Central Asia and elsewhere, potentially aggravating Russia’s already uneasy racial and religious tensions.”
Or take oil and gas production, which accounts for one-third of the country’s budget, 64% of its export revenue, 30% of foreign direct investment, and a little more than 20% of gross domestic product.
There’s bad news here, too. Oil production is set to decline this year for the first time in a decade, a decline that is widely expected to accelerate rapidly in 2010. Of Russia’s 14 largest oil fields, seven are more than 50% depleted. Production at its four largest gas fields is also in decline. Russia drilled about four million feet of new wells last year. In 1990, it drilled 17 million.
None of this is because Russia is necessarily running out of oil and gas: Existing fields could be better managed, and huge expanses of territory remain unexplored. Instead, it is a function of underinvestment, incompetence, corruption, political interference and crude profiteering. “If you’re running Gazprom but you don’t really own it, then your interest is in maximizing short-term profits, not long-term development,” a Western diplomat told McClatchy’s Tom Lasseter.
Amazingly, the system is of deliberate design, as if nothing was learned from the collapse of communism. Parastatal companies are rarely if ever efficient. Yet Mr. Putin has gone about effectively nationalizing entire industries. Foreign investors crave predictability. Yet Mr. Putin has created conditions which his own president, Dmitry Medvedev, calls “legal nihilism.” Foreign customers of Russia’s commodities seek reliable supplies. Yet Mr. Putin has made no secret of his willingness to turn the energy spigot off whenever it suits his political convenience.
With the exception of Robert Mugabe, no other leader has so completely fouled his own nest as Mr. Putin, or squandered so much international good will. In 2003, Mr. Putin formed, with Germany and France, a coalition of the unwilling to oppose the invasion of Iraq. It was a coalition he might have built on to consolidate Russia’s place in, and perhaps eventually atop, Europe. Even Condoleezza Rice seemed prepared to go along, with her reported inane comment that the U.S. should “forgive” Russia while “ignoring” Germany and “punishing” France.
Instead, we have the spectacles of Russia’s nasty meddling in Ukraine’s 2004 disputed presidential election, the murder in Britain of ex-KGB man Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, and to cap it off this month’s Georgia venture.
Now the Poles have agreed to U.S. missile defense, John McCain’s call to expel Russia from the G-8 suddenly seems credible, and even European leftists are looking askance at the man they once cheered for his Iraq stance. No doubt Mr. Putin despises these people — and can afford to, as long as Europe remains overwhelmingly reliant on Russian energy and energy prices remain high.
But those prices are bound to fall, as they always have. What will Russia be left with then? And what will it mean for Mr. Putin’s clique, where the possibility of infighting has only grown with the split between his ex-KGB siloviki pals who wanted the presidency and the members of Mr. Medvedev’s camp who got it?
For much of its history, Russia has been a weak state masquerading as a strong one — a psychological profile in insecurity. That’s why it has generally sought its advantage internationally by acting as an opportunistic spoiler, as it now does over Iran, rather than as a constructive partner seeking to magnify its influence (à la Britain) or as a rising power patiently asserting its place (à la China).
How does one deal with a neurotic? Not by coddling him. Russia is dangerous but it’s also weak, and it would be good to find ways to remind it of that latter fact. Stinger missiles for Georgia would be a start.
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13 réponses à “La Russie, un tigre en papier-mâché”
28 août 08 à 08:34
dans l’armée, le drapeau rouge.
Sauf en Géorgie. Tous les blindés avaient le drapeau russe.
28 août 08 à 03:33
C’est pas faute d’avoir été prévenu…
http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_303ddvps9f7
http://pasta.cantbedone.org/pages/3tJGKF.htm
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=6553
Lettre ouverte au Président Bush
Par Vladimir Boukovsky et Elena Bonner, FrontPageMagazine.com, 10 mars 2003
Cher M. le Président,
… Notre propre expérience, sous un régime aussi détestable que celui de l’Union soviétique, nous a appris que la liberté est une des rares choses qui valent la peine qu’on se batte et meure pour elles. Et plus tôt nous le ferons, mieux cela vaudra parce que de tels régimes, comme l’histoire l’a prouvé encore et encore, ne nous laissent d’autre choix que de les affronter et de les détruire parce qu’ils sont, par leur nature même, aussi bien oppressifs à l’intérieur qu’agressifs à l’extérieur.
De même, nous ne comprenons pas pourquoi il serait si important d’obtenir encore une résolution de plus du Conseil de Sécurité, si cela ne passait pas pour l’être dans le cas beaucoup moins évident ,de la campagne de l’OTAN contre la Yougoslavie en 1999. Tout de même, le régime de Milošević fait pâle figure à côté de celui de Saddam.
Cependant, pourquoi serait-il nécessaire de lutter pour cette noble cause en s’alliant avec des États qui, pour l’essentiel, ne sont pas différents de celui de Saddam Hussein et de l’ancienne Union soviétique ? Pourquoi devrions-nous cautionner la quasi-extermination de certains peuples pour en libérer d’autres ? N’est-ce pas un prix inacceptable à payer pour l’avantage douteux que de telles alliances peuvent nous apporter ?
Ce qui est en cause est, évidemment, la Russie. Contrairement à la croyance populaire en Occident, celle-ci n’est pas sur le chemin de la démocratie ni du libéralisme. Les dernières élections présidentielles vous montrent quel genre de démocratie ce pays s’est donné, les électeurs ayant eu le choix entre un dirigeant communiste et un colonel du KGB. C’est cela, les élections à la russe.
En fait, c’est le KGB qui a gagné. Après 10 ans de tentatives de réforme hésitantes et timorées, on lui a rendu le pouvoir, une fois de plus, et il a fait très vite pour réimposer son autorité dans tout le pays, de même que pour réinstaller les anciens symboles de l’Union soviétique : l’hymne national et, dans l’armée, le drapeau rouge. L’un après l’autre, les derniers médias indépendants ont été fermés. Pendant dix ans, nous n’avions pas eu de prisonniers politiques ; maintenant, nous en avons. Plusieurs personnes sont déjà en prison pour avoir protesté contre la guerre en Tchétchénie, ou contre des crimes que l’armée y a commis, ou contre la pollution par les déchets nucléaires militaires. Aujourd’hui, la Tchétchénie est une des plaies purulentes de notre pays : sous les yeux de nombreux observateurs internationaux, on commet un véritable génocide contre ce petit peuple sans défense.
Il existe un grand nombre de rapports bien documentés sur ce qu’on appelle les “zatchistki” (opérations de nettoyage), où la population de villages entiers est enfermée dans des camps de filtration, torturée et assassinée, et où ne peuvent survivre que ceux pour qui la famille a payé une rançon.
Aujourd’hui, en Russie, la corruption est une chose d’un autre monde. Ce n’est plus de la corruption, c’est un système où le KGB (qui s’appelle maintenant le FSB) dirige la plus grande partie du crime organisé : du racket, du trafic de drogue, des ventes d’armes et des assassinats sur commande. En fait, il est devenu quelque chose comme un syndicat du crime, assez proche du fameux S.P.E.C.T.R.E. des films de James Bond.
Et pourtant, au départ de l’effort pour créer une coalition anti-terroriste, le Premier ministre britannique Tony Blair, sans nul doute en consultation avec Washington, est allé en Russie pour y accueillir ce nouvel allié. Il a exprimé son plaisir de voir que dans cette guerre la Russie se tiendrait enfin aux côtés de l’Occident, disant notamment, a-t-il dit,
“parce que la Russie a une si grande expérience dans la lutte contre le terrorisme”
Nous n’avions jamais cru que nous vivrions assez longtemps pour entendre des propos pareils de la part d’un politicien occidental de premier plan. C’est presque aussi odieux et ridicule que de dire que l’Allemagne a une vaste expérience dans la manière de traiter les juifs. C’est la Russie qui, sous son ancienne incarnation d’Union soviétique, a pratiquement inventé le terrorisme politique moderne, l’élevant au rang de politique d’État. D’abord, pour mater sa propre population, puis pour étendre son influence dans l’ensemble du monde.
Leur “expérience” dans le traitement du terrorisme musulman est encore plus spectaculaire. Comme vous le savez certainement, ils ont armé Saddam pendant des décennies, lui fournissant entre autres des installations pour la guerre biologique. Un autre pays, l’Afghanistan, est probablement un exemple encore plus approprié. Il n’y a guère de doute dans notre esprit que l’état actuellement lamentable de ce pays, y compris l’émergence du mouvement Taliban, y est la conséquence directe de la “Révolution d’avril” inspirée par les Soviets en 1978 puis, après son échec, de l’invasion soviétique de 1979 qui a déstabilisé le pays et l’a plongé dans le cauchemar d’une guerre civile de 20 ans. Est-ce cela, l’expérience que l’Occident cherche à partager ?
Mais, bien sûr, cette citation de Tony Blair était beaucoup plus qu’une exécrable idiotie. Elle entendait signaler un changement de l’attitude occidentale vis-à-vis de la conduite des Russes en Tchétchénie.
Avant le 11 septembre, la critique occidentale du génocide qu’ils y commettent, si modérée et étouffée qu’elle pût être, avait encore pour effet de retenir les maîtres de la Russie. Désormais, après avoir fait de la Russie un partenaire de la coalition, on n’a plus aucun frein de ce genre. Qui plus est, on déclare que cette guerre insensée, génocidaire, contre un petit peuple serait une expérience dont l’Occident devrait s’inspirer. Si c’est aujourd’hui le cas, quelqu’un peut-il nous expliquer pourquoi Slobodan Milošević est toujours en prison à La Haye ? En toute justice, il faudrait le relâcher et lui décerner un Prix Nobel de la paix, parce que son “expérience dans la lutte contre le terrorisme” en Bosnie et au Kosovo n’est guère différente de l’expérience russe en Tchétchénie, avec cette différence que ses exploits sur le terrain pâlissent si on les compare aux atrocités russes [pâlissent parce qu’ils sont anciens ; autrement, ils sont tout à fait comparables].
Ceci, cependant, n’a été qu’un début Le danger du “partenariat” avec des régimes criminels est qu’ils n’ont de cesse qu’ils ne fassent de vous un complice de leurs exactions.
Lentement mais sûrement, les maîtres de la Russie contraignent leurs partenaires occidentaux à accepter leurs crimes en Tchétchénie comme faisant partie d’un combat commun contre le terrorisme. Votre gouvernement a déjà cédé à cette pression et inscrit un certain nombre de groupes tchétchènes sur votre “liste noire” d’organisations terroristes internationales, alors que vous ne savez rien sur elles si ce n’est ce que le KGB vous raconte. Tout à coup, les polices occidentales se sont transformées en sortes de garçons de courses pour le KGB, étant obligées d’arrêter toute personne que Moscou désigne comme “terroriste”, et d’entreprendre une procédure d’extradition, même si la personne en question est, comme Ahmed Zakaïev, un représentant parfaitement connu du gouvernement légitime des Tchétchènes.
Si cela doit continuer, Monsieur le Président, vous pouvez nous compter tous sans hésiter au nombre des terroristes : étant donné que M. Poutine, votre nouvel ami, a officiellement défini comme terroriste quiconque soutient les Tchétchènes, nous entrons tous dans la définition.
Ainsi, la première victime de cette guerre non encore déclarée, son premier “dommage collatéral”, est le principe fondamental sur lequel votre pays a été construit, enchâssé dans la déclaration d’Indépendance de votre pays, comme le Droit d’un pays de se soulever contre un gouvernement tyrannique ou une occupation étrangère.
Et nous voilà complètement désorientés : George Washington était-il un terroriste ou un combattant pour la liberté ?
Dans cette guerre morale, il n’y a rien de plus dangereux que l’approche de la “Realpolitik”, qui nous a apporté tant de désastres dans le passé. Après tout, Osama ben Laden n’est-il pas le produit secondaire d’un “mariage de raison” comparable conclu dans le passé? N’est-ce pas également vrai de Saddam Hussein ? Et n’est-il pas exact que, même encore aujourd’hui, vos nouveaux “partenaires” comme la Russie vendent en secret de l’équipement militaire aux pays de l’Axe du Mal ? Les États-Unis apprendront-ils jamais cette leçon, ou vont ils toujours nourrir de nouveaux ennemis pendant qu’ils en combattent d’autres?
Dans quelques jours, M. le Président, des millions de par le monde seront collés devant leurs écrans de télévision, absorbés par le drame spectaculaire de la guerre moderne, et perdront de vue l’image plus large. Éblouis par la puissance de feu, fascinés par les “armes intelligentes” en action, nous ne pourrons qu’épisodiquement nous demander :
“pourquoi le gouvernement US n’est-il pas aussi intelligent que les armes dont il dispose ? Pourquoi rend-il toujours les choses si difficiles à ceux qui le soutiennent, même lorsqu’il combat pour une juste et noble cause ?”
Mais lorsque la poussière retombera, et qu’avec elle Saddam Hussein se sera évanoui, il restera une question bien plus troublante encore :
“– était-ce une victoire ou était-ce une défaite ?”
Veuillez agréer, …
Vladimir Boukovsky et Elena Bonner.
Vladimir Boukovsky est un ancien dissident soviétique qui a passé douze ans dans les prisons, camps de travail et hôpitaux psychiatriques de l’URSS en raison de son combat pour la liberté, et dont l’oeuvre comprend Et le vent reprend ses tours, Cette lancinante douleur de la liberté et Jugement à Moscou.
Elena Bonner est une ancienne dissidente soviétique, une militante des Droits de l’homme, et la veuve du Prix Nobel de la Paix Andrei Sakharov.
27 août 08 à 19:28
Lui au moins contribue au débat.
Comme petit copiste oui.
Je contribue au débat ! Sans insulte.
27 août 08 à 16:43
Que cet abruti se contente de poster les links.
…
Lui au moins contribue au débat.
27 août 08 à 14:48
Les messages de Sebaneau n’ont pas grand chose à voir avec du spam,
Que cet abruti se contente de poster les links.
27 août 08 à 12:46
Les messages de Sebaneau n’ont pas grand chose à voir avec du spam, même si les liens pourraient suffire. Je l’invite donc à continuer.
Mercator, je vous recommande l’article de Michael Totten. Si toutefois l’énoncé de faits est susceptible d’ébranler votre vision du monde - ce dont je doute quand je vois qu’elle semble s’appuyer sur les concepts fumeux de cercles d’influence, de multipolarité et d’alliés “traditionnels” - genre les génocidaires serbes (parce que dans leur cas, on peut parler de génocide, je crois).
27 août 08 à 12:13
Sebaneau, assez de spam SVP.
De toutes façons, personne ne vous lit. Ou alors faites des résumés !
27 août 08 à 11:50
Tout d’abord il faudrait que ce sebaneau arrête de nous inonder de copier-coller de propagande débile;
Pour en revenir aux événements récents, il faut reconnaître que la diplomatie américaine et européenne ont accompli un sans faute en matière de conneries!
Mais la diplomatiefrançaise avec le porteur de riz s”est surpassée,soutien à l’indépendance du kosovo et abandon de nos alliés traditionnels serbes afin de libérer la mafia albanaise alliée aux terroristes musulmans !
Résultat des courses, nouvelle guerre froide avec réarmement russe,pour faire bonne mesure accord d’implantation d’une base russe en syrie et si le bouclier antimissiles polonais n’est pas démantelé, à cuba,
Champions du monde je vous dis, mais on est talonné par les ricains !
27 août 08 à 03:27
http://www.newkosovareport.com/200808271165/Columns/Analyzing-Moscow-s-recognition-of-South-Ossetia-and-Abkhazia-as-independent-countries.html
From Kosovo to Georgia: Russia against Russia [and Serbia] PDF Print E-mail
Image , 27 August 2008
When Russia joined Serbia in opposing the independence of Kosovo, the West did not like it, but when Moscow said that the recognition could create a precedent, this concern was considered a legitimate one [by those who didn’t know the 1974 Constitution]. After all, the world is full of ethnic divisions, although most of them relatively dormant.
Therefore the West promised that this would be a unique case defined by two conditions: the long record of crimes against humanity committed by the Serbs during the last decade and Serbia’s inability to integrate Kosovo back. Diplomats and high officials tried to convince Russia that the West was determined to reject any effort to use Kosovo as a precedent. Russia remained unconvinced [they were already intent upon using Kosovo as a bargaining chip or an as excuse for their numerous aggressions against their neighbors].
Of course during those tense months of negotiations with Moscow, no one in the West thought that despite all this talk about international law, Russia would be the first to use Kosovo as a precedent [on the contrary, that possibility was quite obvious].
Why was Russia fighting so hard? If the West joined them and China against any effort to make Kosovo a precedent, who else could have been capable of challenging this decision? Who was Russia afraid of?
Well, apparently, Russia was afraid of itself. This can be the only conclusion given the recent Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. After lecturing the West and the rest of the world about the danger of Kosovo precedent, Russia became the first in history to use it as one.
Comparison with Kosovo is quite a long stretch
Russia’s position is simple: if Kosovo has the right to become a state, why not South Ossetia and Abkhazia? It is a question that some people have been asking in the West too –those who either have little knowledge about either case or have political or economic reasons to go against their current governments.
Georgia treatment of these two provinces is nothing to be proud of. However, this is not even near the mass graves filled with killed civilians that the Serbian army and aramilitary units left behind in Kosovo. It is enough to mention the 800 bodies that the Serbs took with them from Kosovo to Belgrade in a desperate effort to hide their crimes from history [actually, almost 1,000 have already been repatriated]. These bodies were found later buried in three mass graves near the capital of Serbia. They were added to more than 10,000 civilians killed during the war in Kosovo, most of them ethnic Albanians [that’s closer to 12,000].
Georgians may have never been serious about improving the life of the Ossetians and Abkhazians but they have never planned a forced mass exodus of their populations as the Serbs did and later executed in Kosovo. [On the contrary, the Georgians have been the victims of massive ethnic cleansing]
The extent to which the Serbs have burned their bridges with the Kosovars is seen in the inability of the most moderate politicians in both sides to sit and agree with each other [That’s inaccurate: The LDS leadership is quite willing to sit down with the Kosovars]. Despite all these, the West has insisted, to the strong discontent of the Kosovars, to offer only conditional independence to Kosovo. The new state will be under supervision and its treatment of minorities, its relations with neighbors and its self-ruling efficiency will determine whether this independence will stand the test of time.
This is a far cry from the way the Russians have supported the full and undisputable independence of the two autonomous “republics”.
Leaving principles and moral issues aside and putting on the practical lens: an independent Kosovo is the only practical choice in the region. Kosovo is too big for Serbia to handle. Belgrade and the region cannot afford a long-term conflict. Kosovo in Serbia is not like Chechnya in Russia, a rebelling corner in a large federation. A more adequate comparison would be with Russia trying to recover a territory four times the size of Ukraine.
While some can say that Abkhazia is not that small compared to Georgia either, it is worth pointing out that while Serbia has a population of around four times the population of Kosovo, Georgia has a population of 18 times the population of Abkhazia (of which at least 20% are Georgians and less than half ethnic Abkhazians [not to mention the 40 % Georgians who have been victims of ethnic cleansing]). While it is not fair to discriminate on the basis of population size, it is also worth noting that Kosovo with two million people is not identical to South Ossetia of 70 thousand.
Finally, what really matters is that Kosovo with its larger size and blessed with natural resources is a viable state while the two former Georgian provinces will be at the mercy of Russian life support and will practically join the federation de facto if not de jure.
A blow to Russia’s image
By opposing the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence Russia somehow became a champion to the countries that fear the creation of new states could one day endanger their own territorial integrity. Many of them care little for Serbia and few of them see a practical connection between Kosovo’s case and their own situation, but they considered it prudent to see this project fail.
However, with its decision to “recognize” both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics, Russia is bound to become a strong disappointment in the eyes of those who thought that its opposition to Kosovo’s independence was based on principles. Furthermore, by keeping unchanged its position on Kosovo, Russia appears as hypocritical by the rest of the countries, which recognized the self-determination right of Kosovo.
After carefully and craftily building a strong image in the world, Russia has rushed to taint it within a few weeks with military and political moves that wwere completely avoidable. For the first time in recent years, Russia has shown little confidence in its political clout in international affairs.
Since the second week of August, many friends of Georgia throughout the world had thought that Georgia fell into Russia’s trap by responding with force to “South Ossetians’ harassment” [actually they were perfectly aware of the larger invasion, and that’s what they responded to]. However, now is the time for the friends of Russia to scratch their heads and try to understand how Russia did this to itself.
Were those two provinces worth Russia’s international image, or a possible change in the Western position on Chechnya and other republics in the Daghestan area or elsewhere in the federation? [Don’t hold your breath] Until now, Russia was in the comfortable international position of blaming the West for weakening the UN. Russia’s yesterday decision reversed the situation.
Furthermore, to Serbia, which has placed much its trust and hope on Russia’s support for their fight against Kosovo’s independence, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states is bad news. Now, Belgrade has to find a way to refuse Russia’s invitation to join it in its new unreasonable stance, which, as the foreign minister of Sweden said, is not against the West any more , but against the entire international community.
27 août 08 à 01:57
http://docs.google.com/Doc?id=dc2m8p62_299gddmn2cm
http://pasta.cantbedone.org/pages/ILqg0n.htm
http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2008/08/the-truth-about-1.php
The Truth About Russia in Georgia
Michael Totten, 26 August 2008
I Am Georgia Stop Russia.jpg
TBILISI, GEORGIA – Virtually everyone believes Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili foolishly provoked a Russian invasion on August 7, 2008, when he sent troops into the breakaway district of South Ossetia. “The warfare began Aug. 7 when Georgia launched a barrage targeting South Ossetia,” the Associated Press reported over the weekend in typical fashion.
Virtually everyone is wrong. Georgia didn’t start it on August 7, nor on any other date. The South Ossetian militia started it on August 6 when its fighters fired on Georgian peacekeepers and Georgian villages with weapons banned by the agreement hammered out between the two sides in 1994. At the same time, the Russian military sent its invasion force bearing down on Georgia from the north side of the Caucasus Mountains on the Russian side of the border through the Roki tunnel and into Georgia. This happened before Saakashvili sent additional troops to South Ossetia and allegedly started the war.
Regional expert, German native, and former European Commission official Patrick Worms was recently hired by the Georgian government as a media advisor, and he explained to me exactly what happened when I met him in downtown Tbilisi. You should always be careful with the version of events told by someone on government payroll even when the government is as friendly and democratic as Georgia’s. I was lucky, though, that another regional expert, author and academic Thomas Goltz, was present during Worms’ briefing to me and signed off on it as completely accurate aside from one tiny quibble.
Goltz has been writing about the Caucasus region for almost 20 years, and he isn’t on Georgian government payroll. He earns his living from the University of Montana and from the sales of his books Azerbaijan Diary, Georgia Diary and Chechnya Diary. Goltz experienced these three Caucasus republics at their absolute worst, and he knows the players and the events better than just about anyone. Every journalist in Tbilisi seeks him out as the old hand who knows more than the rest of us put together, and he wanted to hear Patrick Worms’ spiel to reporters in part to ensure its accuracy.
“–You,” Worms said to Goltz just before he started to flesh out the real story to me, “are going to be bored because I’m going to give some back story that you know better than I do.”
“– Go,” Goltz said. “Go.”
The back story began at least as early as the time of the Soviet Union. I turned on my digital voice recorder so I wouldn’t miss anything that was said.
Patrick Worms Map Tbilisi.jpg
Patrick Worms
“– A key tool that the Soviet Union used to keep its empire together,” Worms said to me, “was pitting ethnic groups against one another. They did this extremely skillfully in the sense that they never generated ethnic wars within their own territory. But when the Soviet Union collapsed it became an essential Russian policy to weaken the states on its periphery by activating the ethnic fuses they planted.
Peacekeeper Poster Tbilisi.jpg
A poster on a wall in Tbilisi, Georgia
“They tried that in a number of countries. They tried it in the Baltic states, but the fuses were defused. Nothing much happened. They tried it in Ukraine. It has not happened yet, but it’s getting hotter. They tried it in Moldova. There it worked, and now we have Transnitria. They tried it in Armenia and Azerbaijan and it went beyond their wildest dreams and we ended up with a massive, massive war. And they tried it in two territories in Georgia, which I’ll talk about in a minute. They didn’t try it in Central Asia because basically all the presidents of the newly independent countries were the former heads of the communist parties and they said we’re still following your line, Kremlin, we haven’t changed very much.”
Nagorno-Karabakh Map2.JPG
He’s right about the massive war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, though few outside the region know much about it. Armenians and Azeris very thoroughly transferred Azeris and Armenians “back” to their respective mother countries after the Soviet Union collapsed through pogroms, massacres, and ethnic-cleansing. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled savage communal warfare in terror. The Armenian military still occupies the ethnic-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh region in southwestern Azerbaijan. It’s another so-called “frozen conflict” in the Caucasus region waiting to thaw. Moscow takes the Armenian side and could blow up Nagorno-Karabakh, and subsequently all of Azerbaijan, at any time. After hearing the strident Azeri point of view on the conflict for a week before I arrived in Georgia, I’d say that particular ethnic-nationalist fuse is about one millimeter in length.
“– Now the story starts really in 1992 when this fuse was lit in Georgia,” Worms said. “Now, there’s two territories. There’s Abkhazia which has clearly defined administrative borders, and there’s South Ossetia that doesn’t. Before the troubles started, Abkhazia was an extremely ethnically mixed area: about 60 percent Georgian, 20 percent Abkhaz, and 20 percent assorted others – Greeks, Estonians, Armenians, Jews, what have you. In Ossetia it was a completely integrated and completely mixed Ossetian-Georgian population. The Ossetians and the Georgians have never been apart in the sense that they were living in their own little villages and doing their own little things. There has been inter-marriage and a sense of common understanding going back to distant history. The Georgians will tell you about King Tamar – that’s a woman, but they called her a king – and she was married to an Ossetian.
So the fuse was lit and two wars start, one in Abkhazia and one in South Ossetia.”
Georgia Map.jpg
Georgia
South Ossetia is inside Georgia, while North Ossetia is inside Russia.
“– The fuse was not just lit in Moscow,” he said. “It was also lit in Tbilisi. There was a guy in charge here, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a little bit like [Serbian Nationalist war criminal in Bosnia Radovan] Karadžić [Karadžić was a Serbian puppet]. He was a poet. He was an intellectual. But he was one of these guys who veered off into ethnic exclusivism. He made stupid declarations like Georgia is only for the Georgians. If you’re running a multi-ethnic country, that is really not a clever thing to say. The central control of the state was extremely weak. The Russians were trying to make things worse. There was a civil war between Georgians and Tbilisi. But the key thing is that here there were militias, Georgian militias, and some of them pretty nasty.”
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Thomas Goltz
Thomas Goltz then interjected his only critique of Patrick Worms’ explanation of events that led to this war.
“–It started in 1991,” he said, “but it went into 1992 and 1993, as well.”
Then he turned to me.
“– This guy, [Zviad] Gamsakhurdia, was driven from power from across the street. They bombed this place.”
He meant the Marriott Hotel. We stood in the lobby where Worms had set up his media relations operation.
“– There’s a horrible picture in my Georgia book of this facade.”
“–Of this building?” I said.
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Marriot Hotel (right), Tbilisi, Georgia
“– Yeah,” Goltz said. “That was December 1991. He fled in December 1991.”
“– Where did he go?” I said.
“– To Chechnya,” Goltz said. “Of course. He led the government in exile until he came back in 1993 then died obscurely in the mountains, of suicide some people say, others say cancer. Then he was buried in Grozny.”
He turned then again to Patrick Worms.
“– 1991,” he said. “Not 1992.”
“– 1991,” Worms said. “Okay.”
So aside from that quibble, everything else Worms said to me was vouched for as accurate by the man who literally wrote the book on this conflict from the point of view of both academic and witness.
“– So in 1991,” Worms said, “things here explode. And basically it gets pretty nasty. Thomas can tell you what happened. Read his book, it’s worth it. And by the time the dust settles, there are between 20,000 and 30,000 dead. Many atrocities committed by both sides, but mostly – at least that’s what the Georgians say – by the Abkhaz. And the end result is everybody gets kicked out. Everybody who is not Abkhaz or Russian gets kicked out. That’s about 400,000 people. 250,000 of those still live as Internally Displaced Persons within Georgia. As for the rest: the Greeks have gone back to Greece, the Armenians to Armenia, some Abkhaz to Turkey, etc.
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Abkhazia (upper left)
“When it’s over,” he said, “you’ve got two bits of Abkhazia which are not ethnic Abkhazia. You’ve got Gali district which is filled with ethnic Georgians. And you’ve got the Kodori Gorge which is filled with another bunch of Georgians. So there the end result was a classic case of ethnic-cleansing, but the world didn’t pay much attention because it was happening at the same time as the Yugoslav wars. Ossetia was different. Ossetia also had a war that started about the same time, and it was also pretty nasty, but it never quite succeeded in generating a consolidated bit of territory that Ossetians could keep their own. When the dust settled there, you ended up with a patchwork of Georgian and Ossetian villages. Before the war, Ossetians and Georgians lived together in the same villages. After the war they lived in separate villages. But there were still contacts. People were talking, people were trading. It wasn’t quite as nasty as it was in Abkhazia.
South Ossetia Map.JPG
“– Now fast forward to the Rose Revolution,” he said.
The Rose Revolution was a popular bloodless revolution that brought Georgia’s current president Mikheil Saakashvili to power and replaced the old man of Georgian politics Eduard Shevardnadze who basically ran the country Soviet-style.
“– The first thing that Misha [Mikheil Saakashvili] did was try to poke his finger in [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s eyes as many times as possible,” Worms said, “most notably by wanting to join NATO. The West, in my view, mishandled this situation. America gave the wrong signals. So did Europe.”
“– Can you elaborate on that a bit?” I said.
“– I will,” he said. “But basically the encouragement was given despite stronger and stronger Russian signals that a Georgian accession to NATO would not be tolerated. Fast forward to 2008, to this year, to the meeting of NATO heads of state that took place in Bucharest, Romania, where Georgia was promised eventual membership of the organization but was refused what it really wanted, which was the so-called Membership Action Plan.
The Membership Action Plan is the bureaucratic tool NATO uses to prepare countries for membership. And this despite the fact that military experts will tell you that the Georgian Army, which had been reformed root and branch with American support, was now in better shape and more able to meet NATO aspirations than the armies of Albania and Macedonia which got offered membership at the same meeting.
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Tbilisi, Georgia
“– Just a little bit of back story again, in July of 2007 Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe. This is a Soviet era treaty that dictates where NATO and the Warsaw Pact can keep their conventional armor around their territories. Russia started moving a lot of materiel south. After Bucharest, provocations started. Russian provocations started, and they were mostly in Abkhazia.
“– One provocation was to use the Russian media to launch shrill accusations that the Georgian army was in Kodori preparing for an invasion of Abkhazia. Now if you go up there – I took a bunch of journalists up there a few times – when you get to the actual checkpoint you have a wall of crumbling rock, a wooden bridge, another wall of crumbling rock, a raging torrent, and a steep mountainside filled with woods. It’s not possible to invade out or invade in unless you’ve got air support. Which is why the Abkhaz were never able to kick these Georgians out. They just kept that bit of territory.”
He paused and looked over at Thomas Goltz as though he was bracing for a critique.
“– I’m just doing what I’ve done already,” he said, “but this time I’m getting advice from an expert on how I’m doing.”
Thomas Goltz silently nodded.
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Tbilisi, Georgia
“– Kodori provocations,” Worms continued, “and other provocations. First the Russians had a peacekeeping base under a 1994 agreement that allowed them to keep the peace in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They added paratroopers, crack paratroopers, with modern weaponry there. That doesn’t sound a lot like peacekeeping. A further provocation: they start shooting unmanned Georgian aircraft drones out the sky. One of them was caught on camera by the drone as it was about to be destroyed. The United Nations confirmed that it was a Russian plane that did this. It probably took off from an airbase that the Russians were supposed to have vacated a few years ago, but they never let the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] in to check.
“The next provocation: On April 16 Putin signs a presidential decree recognizing the documents of Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Russia and vice versa. This effectively integrates these two territories into Russia’s legal space. The Georgians were furious. So you have all these provocations mounting and mounting and mounting. Meanwhile, as of July, various air corps start moving from the rest of Russia to get closer to the Caucasus. These are obscure details, but they are available.
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A poster on a wall in Tbilisi, Georgia
“Starting in mid July the Russians launched the biggest military exercise in the North Caucasus that they’ve held since the Chechnya war. That exercise never stopped. It just turned into a war. They had all their elite troops there, all their armor there, all their stuff there. Everyone still foolishly thought the action was going to be in Abkhazia or in Chechnya, which is still not as peaceful as they’d like it to be.
“The Georgians had their crack troops in Iraq. So what was left at their central base in Gori? Not very much. Just Soviet era equipment and not their best troops. They didn’t place troops on the border with Abkhazia because they didn’t want to provoke the Abkhaz. They were expecting an attempt on Kodori, but the gorge is in such a way that unless they’re going to use massive air support – which the Abkhaz don’t have – it’s impossible to take that place. Otherwise they would have done it already.
“So fast forward to early August. You have a town, Tskhinvali, which is Ossetian, and a bunch of Georgian villages surrounding it in a crescent shape. There are peacekeepers there. Both Russian peacekeepers and Georgian peacekeepers under a 1994 accord. The Ossetians were dug in in the town, and the Georgians were in the forests and the fields between the town and the villages. The Ossetians start provoking and provoking and provoking by shelling Georgian positions and Georgian villages around there. And it’s a classic tit for tat thing. You shell, I shell back. The Georgians offered repeated ceasefires, which the Ossetians broke.
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A poster on a wall in Tbilisi, Georgia
“On August 3, the head of the local administration says he’s evacuating his civilians. You also need to know one thing: you may be wondering what these areas live off, especially in Ossetia, there’s no industry there. Georgia is poor, but Ossetia is poorer. It’s basically a smuggler’s paradise. There was a sting operation that netted three kilograms of highly enriched uranium. There are fake hundred dollar bills to the tune of at least 50 million dollars that have been printed. [South Ossetian “President” Eduard] Kokoity himself is a former wrestler and a former bodyguard who was promoted to the presidency by powerful Ossetian families as their puppet. What does that mean in practice? It means that if you are a young man, you have no choice. You can either live in absolute misery, or you can take the government’s dime and join the militia. It happened in both territories.
“On top of that, for the last four years the Russians have been dishing out passports to anyone who asks in those areas. All you have to do is present your Ossetian or Abkhaz papers and a photo and you get a Russian passport on the spot. If you live in Moscow and try to get a Russian passport, you have the normal procedure to follow, and it takes years. So suddenly you have a lot of Ossetian militiamen and Abkhaz militiamen with Russian passports in effect paid by Russian subsidies.
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Tbilisi, Georgia
“So back to the 3rd of August. Kokoity announces women and children should leave. As it later turned out, he made all the civilians leave who were not fighting or did not have fighting capabilities. On the same day, irregulars – Ingush, Chechen, Ossetians, and Cossacks – start coming in and spreading out into the countryside but don’t do anything. They just sit and wait. On the 6th of August the shelling intensifies from Ossetian positions. And for the first time since the war finished in 1992, they are using 120mm guns.”
“– Can I stop you for a second?” I said. I was still under the impression that the war began on August 7 and that Georgian President Saakashvili started it when he sent troops into South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali. What was all this about the Ossetian violence on August 6 and before?
He raised his hand as if to say stop.
“– That was the formal start of the war,” he said. “Because of the peace agreement they had, nobody was allowed to have guns bigger than 80mm. Okay, so that’s the formal start of the war. It wasn’t the attack on Tskhinvali. Now stop me.”
“– Okay,” I said. “All the reports I’ve read say Saakashvili started the war.”
“– I’m not yet on the 7th,” he said. “I’m on the 6th.”
“– Okay,” I said. He had given this explanation to reporters before, and he knew exactly what I was thinking.
“– Saakashvili is accused of starting this war on the 7th,” he said.
“– Right,” I said. “But that sounds like complete bs to me if what you say is true.”
Thomas Goltz nodded.
*
I later met wounded Georgian soldiers in a Tbilisi hospital who confirmed what Patrick Worms had told me about what happened when the war actually started. I felt apprehensive about meeting wounded soldiers. Would they really want to talk to someone in the media or would they rather spend their time healing in peace?
My translator spoke to some of the doctors in the hospital who directed us to Georgian soldiers and a civilian who were wounded in South Ossetia and felt okay enough to speak to a foreign reporter.
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Kaha Bragadze
“– Every day and every hour the Russian side lied,” Georgian soldier Kaha Bragadze said. “It must be stopped. If not today, then maybe tomorrow. My troops were in our village, Avnevi. On the 6th of August they blew up our troops’ four-wheel-drives, our pickups. They blew them up. Also in this village – it was August 5th or 6th, I can’t remember – they started bombing us with shells. Two soldiers died that day, our peacekeepers. The Ossetians had a good position on the hill. They could see all our positions and our villages, and they started bombing. They went to the top of the hill, bombed us, then went down. We couldn’t see who was shooting at us.”
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Kaha Bragadze’s leg wounded by shrapnel from a Russian air strike
“– Which day was this?” I said. “The 5th or the 6th?”
“– I don’t remember,” he said. “But it started that day from that place when two Georgians were killed.”
“– Were they just bombing you the peacekeepers,” I said, “or also civilians and villages?”
“– Before they started bombing us they took all the civilians out of their villages,” he said. “Then they started damaging our villages – houses, a gas pipe, roads, yards. They killed our animals. They evacuated their villages, then bombed our villages.”
Another Georgian soldier, Giorgi Khosiashvili, concurred
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Giorgi Khosiashvili
“– I was a peacekeeper as well,” he said, “but in another village. I was fired upon on August 6th. On the 5th of August they started shooting. They blew up our peacekeeping trucks. They put a bomb on the road and when they were driving they were blown up. They also mined the roads used by civilians. On the 6th of August they started bombing Avnevi. And at this time they took the civilians out of Tskhinvali and sent them to North Ossetia [inside Russia].”
“– I saw this on TV,” said Alex, my translator. “They took the civilians, kids, women, and put them on the bus and sent them to Nort
