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500 ADM en Irak

Posté le Jeudi 22 juin 2006 par Sittingbull

Tiens, pourquoi on n’entend pas parler?

Sittingbull @ 13:44
Catégorie(s): De la guerre et de la paix etGénéralités


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16 réponses à “500 ADM en Irak”

  • 16
    Frédéric:

    Rien de nouveau sur cette annonce de possesion d’armes chimiques par ce groupe ? Coup de bluf sans lendemain ?

  • 15
    Frédéric:

    Si seulement Kadrik avait raison, cette article sur l’annonce d’armes chimiques par un groupe Palestinien ne serait pas si grave :

    http://a7fr.net/Default.aspx?tabid=52&articleType=ArticleView&articleId=9446

  • 14
    madimaxi:

    les agents actifs d’obus chimiques ont une durée de vie de 3 à 6 mois au maximum

    Dans un contexte opérationnel, configuration campagne (manipulation fréquente, exposition à la chaleur, etc.) et c’est un délai de sécurité, communément admis, pour ne pas provoquer de dégâts involontaires au sein de ses propres lignes.
    Dans des conditions stockage c’est beaucoup plus long. Pour les obus binaires notamment mais aussi pour des vieilles casseroles de 14-18 dont on ne sait pas trop quoi faire. :
    …où les autorités ont décidé de stocker le toujours dangereux reliquat de la Grande Guerre. (Suippes). L’acheminement des 55 tonnes d’obus contenant du phosgène, de l’ypérite, ou  » gaz moutarde « , et de la chloropicine, tous des produits hautement toxiques, a demandé la mise en place d’un plan spécial vraiment hors normes. L’escorte des sept camions réfrigérés contenant les munitions était composée de 51 véhicules de la gendarmerie, de la sécurité civile et de l’armée tandis que sur toute la longueur du parcours, la très longue caravane nocturne (les camions porteurs étaient espacés de plusieurs centaines de mètres afin d’éviter le cumul des risques) était surveillée par quatre détachements de la sécurité civile et des services d’incendie et de secours ainsi que par deux cents gendarmes. Étaient également mobilisés deux hélicoptères SAMU et deux PUMA médicalisés de l’armée…
    …Ce stockage est provisoire, le gouvernement devant décider de la prochaine construction d’une installation d’élimination de ces obus, puisque la France ne possède pas d’installation rendant possible l’élimination des vestiges des guerres chimiques.

    L’Humanité (tiens !) du 17.04.2001.

  • 13
    Frédéric:

    Pour Kadrik, vous confondez sans doute la durée de la toxicité des gaz de combat aprés « utilisation » avec leur durée de conservation dans les munitions car en effet, le sarin, par exemple, à une duré mortelle fugace permettant à l’attaquant d’occuper le terrain sans trop de précaution aprés avoir gazé l’adversaire.

    Je vous signale ce site de l’ONU sur l’interdiction des armes chimiques si vous voulez plus d’infos :

    http://www.opcw.org/fr/index.html

  • 12
    michael:

    vous faites donc preuve de mauvaise foi. Soit.
    —-. Allez, assumez donc votre mauvaise foi jusqu’au bout.
    +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    Si ma  » mauvaise foi  » est a vos yeux une affaire entendue , soyez donc consequent avec vous meme et continuez ce debat avec votre miroir ou un poisson rouge , au choix ……

  • 11
    Frédéric:

    Donnez donc un lien de cette organisme sur le sujet – non un de  »l’homme qui a vu l’homme qui a vue l’ours » car si les gaz de combat sont inofensifs au bout de 6 mois, pourquoi donc la France n’arrive pas a sans débarrasser ???

    On à méme été d’obliger d’en envoyer dans une usine en Belgique pour les détruire.

    PS : J’ai fait 2 ans de service au 45eme rég. de transmission, – Montélimar (au dessus de la capitale culturelle de l’Europe, Avignon ;) , non à Tel Aviv.

  • 10
    Kadrik:

    Et vous Frederic, lisez donc les rapports de l’AIEA sur les ADM en Irak au lieu de tirer des parallèles historiques ou technologiques ridicules.

    Les agents chimiques en question sont le sarin dont le cycle de vie ne dépasse pas quelques semaines et la gaz moutarde qui c’est vrai dure 12 ans, mais comme les obus sont vieux de 15 ans, ils ont expiré.

    Voilà pour mes soit-disant « contre-vérités ».

  • 9
    Kadrik:

    Donc vu que Tsahal ne lave pas les cerveaux et que vous ne semblez pas totalement ignorants des armes chimiques, vous faites donc preuve de mauvaise foi. Soit.

    PS. Mes connaissances en armes chimiques se limitent à ce que les observateurs de l’AIEA disent sur ces obus. Mais évidemment vous allez une fois de plus croire le porte-parole du Pentagone plutôt que des ingénieurs onusiens neutres et indépendants. Allez, assumez donc votre mauvaise foi jusqu’au bout.

  • 8
    Frédéric:

    Pour Kadrik : « Durée de vie de 6 mois » ???

    Avez vous fait votre service militaire ? Mon adjudant aurait rigoler en attendant cela ;)

    Pourquoi croyer vous donc que les démineurs prennent mille précautions quand on sort un obus chimique des champs de bataille du nord de la France.

    Les armes « modernes » comme le VX peuvent étre stockés des dizaines d’années avant d’étres tirés.

    Les USA qui avaient stoppé leur production d’armes chimiques en 1968/1969 ont attendu 17 ans pour en reprendre la production sous formes d’armes binaires avant de stopper définitivement celle ci.

    Il y encore de dizaines de milliers de tonnes de gaz de combat des 2 Grands stocké encore dans des bunkers car les processus et les installations pour les détruire en toute sécurité sont insuffisant… (:

    Je vous suggére de relire une encyclopédie ou un site scientifique avant de vous lancez dans des contrevérités.

  • 7
    michael:

    Rate . mon cher !
    1)Les obus chimiques n’ont jamais ete vraiment notre « tasse de the » !Pas du tout une arme repandue a Tsahal , desole ! donc j’avoue fierement une connaissance livresque uniquement .A l’armee Suisse , vous jongliez avec tous les matins ?
    2)Les obus « binaires » ont une duree de stockage bien plus longue l’avantage etant une securite de manipulation et de stockage vu que les deux composants rewstent inertes et ne se melangent que pendant le tir ….
    3) »Lavage de cerveau  » vous disiez ?A votre tour d’ignorer totalement ce fait que des gens au cerveau lave font de tres mauvais soldats et a Tsahal en particulier ou chaque grade peut remplacer instantanement quelqu’un au moins deux grades au dessus de lui . Vous avez la connaissance de la mission , le charisme et la volonte , aucun probleme ! Essayez de persuader un robot de faire la meme chose ….Mais j’oubliais que les membres des ONG humanitaires se prennent tous pour capables d’en remontrer a LiddellHart au moins ! Il ne reste plus aux brevetes d’EM ase coltiner les sacs de riz ….

  • 6
    Kadrik:

    michael, vous avez été un soldat et ne savez même pas que les agents actifs d’obus chimiques ont une durée de vie de 3 à 6 mois au maximum?

    Soit le lavage de cerveau tsahalien est franchement efficace, soit votre mauvaise foi dépasse tout entendement ou soit votre ignorance est aussi vaste que le désert du Negev.

    Lamentable.

  • 5
    michael:

    Les cons minables du reseau Voltaire en font des obus non exploses de la guerre Iran Irak , une imbecillite bien dans leur genre surtout qu’en plus , ils niaient l’usage de gaz par Saddam , collant ca sur l’Iran …
    Plutot des depots enterres au plus tard en 2003 . Les dates de production sont une indication mais aux dernieres nouvelles un obus ca se conserve !
    Et comme Saddam avait jure de plus rien posseder …

  • 4
    lagrette:

    Elles datent d’avant 1991

  • 3
    Frédéric:

    Précise t on s’il s’agit de munitions de la guerre Iran Irak ou quelques chose de plus récent ?

  • 2
    lagrette:

    C’etait pas dans mon journal du jour, mais c’etait dans le Figaro

    Par contre beaucoup se demandent pourquoi cette info n’a pas ete diffusee plus tot , notament aux senateurs qui la reclamait. J’ai trouve ca sur le web, qui donne des explications… Il semble qu’il y a encore beaucoup de nettoyage a faire , dans certaines agences federales :

    While a number of bloggers, including Captain’s Quarters and Powerline, have done an excellent job in tracking yesterday’s announcement (and the underwhelming media response), there is a back story that must be told. It’s a story of brueaucratic inepitude, apparent political and personal agendas, and the efforts of a few courageous individuals to get the truth out.

    The story begins in April of this year, when a team of intelligence analysts, assigned to the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) published an exhaustive report on the continued recovery of chemical weapons in Iraq. Their report clearly noted that the weapons were clearly manufactured before the first Gulf War. However, the NGIC analysts also observed that some of the weapons remained in good condition (suggesting an Iraqi effort to preserve them), and posed a potential threat to coalition forces, if they fell into the hands of insurgents. From what I’m told, the report contained a full listing of all chemical weapons discovered in Iraq since the fall of Saddam, cut-away diagrams of the weapons, locations where they were found, and their potential lethality if employed by terrorists.

    Obviously, the NGIC report ran against the conventional wisdom that « Iraq had no WMD » after the U.S.-led invasion, and (to its credit), the organization published the report, which was posted on INTELINK (the intelligence community’s classified intranet) in April of this year. In that forum, the report could be easily accessed by anyone with access to the system, the proper security clearance, and a valid need-to-know. From an analytical standpoint, the team at NGIC did their job, and they deserve tremendous credit for publishing their report. That’s what analysts are supposed to do–tell the truth, and let the chips fall where they may, even if their findings run contrary to popular assumptions and political agendas.

    Shortly after the NGIC item was posted on INTELINK, Senator Santorum learned of its existence, and began pressing the Army for more information, and declassification of the report’s key findings. At this juncture, however, political agendas and bureaucratic tail-covering became a factor. A GOP source sent me a copy of Senator Santorum’s letter, requesting information on chemical weapons in Iraq, back in April. Amazing (or, perhaps not-so-amazingly), both NGIC and the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) ignored Santorum’s request. Normally, DOD agencies are supposed to respond to a request from a member of Congress within 48 hours; the Army ignored Santorum’s request for more than a month. In fact, Santorum and Hoekstra didn’t get their information until the Intelligence Committee chairman obtained a copy of the NGIC report and reportedly « hit the ceiling. » After that, the Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador John Negroponte, agreed to declassify portions of the report, which were released yesterday.

    Why did the Army ignore Senator Santorum’s initial request? That’s an issue that the INSCOM commander, Major General John D. Freitas III, may be asked to explain the next time he’s on the Hill. The same holds true for the NGIC Commander, an Army Colonel. But beyond the DOD’s efforts to « slow-roll » Senator Santorum and Chairman Hoekstra, there’s the larger issue of why the Defense Department and Intelligence Community « sat » on this information. Sources tell me that there is no evidence of the NGIC report making its way into high-visibility intelligence products, such as the daily update for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA’s flagship National Intelligence Daily (NID), or the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), now handled by Negroponte’s staff. Additionally, there was no effort to inform key members of Congress on this issue, until they began demanding answers. Congressman Hoekstra has every right to be pissed; the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee should not learn about the discovery of WMD in Iraq via an « under-the-table » copy of an Army report that was published almost two months earlier.

    As a young intelligence officer, I was drilled that important information should make its way up the chain of command as soon as possible. Apparently, things have changed since I left the business. Information that contradicts prevailing judgements can be ignored, or simply buried on an intelligence website–let the customer find out on his own. If members of Congress want information, simply delay your response as long as possible, and provide data only when someone with enough horsepower (in this case, the HPSCI chairman) demands answers. Then, provide only a fraction of what they ask for.

    If all this sounds vaguely familiar, it should. Such tactics have been part-and-parcel of how the intel community does business for decades. It’s the sort of behavior that has created barriers between various intelligence agencies, and generated lingering suspicion and distrust between the community, the Congress, and (ultimately) the American people. More than a year into his tenure as DNI, Negroponte’s intelligence community is still operating a lot like its predecessor. The American people have a right to know that we’ve been uncovering WMD in Iraq–just as they were led to believe that none still existed. Withholding that information is inexcusable; intel bureaucrats were apparently uncomfortable with the revelation that they had been wrong on Iraqi WMD, not once, not twice, but a total of three times.

    The MSM–if it ever gets around to this story–will likely claim that Santorum and Hoekstra are playing politics with intelligence. This blog has been critical of Congress playing fast-and-loose with intel information in the past, but that doesn’t appear to be the case this time. Santorum and Hoekstra played by the rules, made their requests through proper channels, and only released declassified portions of the document, with the approval of the DNI. Compare that to the antics of Vermont Senator Pat Leahy–who was booted from the Senate intel committee for leaking classified information–and you’ll see that Santorum and Hoekstra were models of patience and decorum.

    Kudos to the NGIC team for publishing this discovery, and to the members of Congress–Santorum, Hoekstra (and Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon)–who pushed for its public release. Our elected officials should demand answers on why this important data never made its way up the chain of command, and why their requests for information were apparently stone-walled by the Pentagon and the intel community.

  • 1
    lagrette:

    C’etait pas dans mon journal du jour, mais c’etait dans le Figaro

    Par contre beaucoup se demandent pourquoi cette info n’a pas ete diffusee plus tot , notament aux senateurs qui la reclamait. J’ai trouve ca sur le web, qui donne des explications… Il semble qu’il y a encore beaucoup de nettoyage a faire , dans certaines agences federales :

    While a number of bloggers, including Captain’s Quarters and Powerline, have done an excellent job in tracking yesterday’s announcement (and the underwhelming media response), there is a back story that must be told. It’s a story of brueaucratic inepitude, apparent political and personal agendas, and the efforts of a few courageous individuals to get the truth out.

    The story begins in April of this year, when a team of intelligence analysts, assigned to the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) published an exhaustive report on the continued recovery of chemical weapons in Iraq. Their report clearly noted that the weapons were clearly manufactured before the first Gulf War. However, the NGIC analysts also observed that some of the weapons remained in good condition (suggesting an Iraqi effort to preserve them), and posed a potential threat to coalition forces, if they fell into the hands of insurgents. From what I’m told, the report contained a full listing of all chemical weapons discovered in Iraq since the fall of Saddam, cut-away diagrams of the weapons, locations where they were found, and their potential lethality if employed by terrorists.

    Obviously, the NGIC report ran against the conventional wisdom that « Iraq had no WMD » after the U.S.-led invasion, and (to its credit), the organization published the report, which was posted on INTELINK (the intelligence community’s classified intranet) in April of this year. In that forum, the report could be easily accessed by anyone with access to the system, the proper security clearance, and a valid need-to-know. From an analytical standpoint, the team at NGIC did their job, and they deserve tremendous credit for publishing their report. That’s what analysts are supposed to do–tell the truth, and let the chips fall where they may, even if their findings run contrary to popular assumptions and political agendas.

    Shortly after the NGIC item was posted on INTELINK, Senator Santorum learned of its existence, and began pressing the Army for more information, and declassification of the report’s key findings. At this juncture, however, political agendas and bureaucratic tail-covering became a factor. A GOP source sent me a copy of Senator Santorum’s letter, requesting information on chemical weapons in Iraq, back in April. Amazing (or, perhaps not-so-amazingly), both NGIC and the Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) ignored Santorum’s request. Normally, DOD agencies are supposed to respond to a request from a member of Congress within 48 hours; the Army ignored Santorum’s request for more than a month. In fact, Santorum and Hoekstra didn’t get their information until the Intelligence Committee chairman obtained a copy of the NGIC report and reportedly « hit the ceiling. » After that, the Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador John Negroponte, agreed to declassify portions of the report, which were released yesterday.

    Why did the Army ignore Senator Santorum’s initial request? That’s an issue that the INSCOM commander, Major General John D. Freitas III, may be asked to explain the next time he’s on the Hill. The same holds true for the NGIC Commander, an Army Colonel. But beyond the DOD’s efforts to « slow-roll » Senator Santorum and Chairman Hoekstra, there’s the larger issue of why the Defense Department and Intelligence Community « sat » on this information. Sources tell me that there is no evidence of the NGIC report making its way into high-visibility intelligence products, such as the daily update for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA’s flagship National Intelligence Daily (NID), or the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), now handled by Negroponte’s staff. Additionally, there was no effort to inform key members of Congress on this issue, until they began demanding answers. Congressman Hoekstra has every right to be pissed; the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee should not learn about the discovery of WMD in Iraq via an « under-the-table » copy of an Army report that was published almost two months earlier.

    As a young intelligence officer, I was drilled that important information should make its way up the chain of command as soon as possible. Apparently, things have changed since I left the business. Information that contradicts prevailing judgements can be ignored, or simply buried on an intelligence website–let the customer find out on his own. If members of Congress want information, simply delay your response as long as possible, and provide data only when someone with enough horsepower (in this case, the HPSCI chairman) demands answers. Then, provide only a fraction of what they ask for.

    If all this sounds vaguely familiar, it should. Such tactics have been part-and-parcel of how the intel community does business for decades. It’s the sort of behavior that has created barriers between various intelligence agencies, and generated lingering suspicion and distrust between the community, the Congress, and (ultimately) the American people. More than a year into his tenure as DNI, Negroponte’s intelligence community is still operating a lot like its predecessor. The American people have a right to know that we’ve been uncovering WMD in Iraq–just as they were led to believe that none still existed. Withholding that information is inexcusable; intel bureaucrats were apparently uncomfortable with the revelation that they had been wrong on Iraqi WMD, not once, not twice, but a total of three times.

    The MSM–if it ever gets around to this story–will likely claim that Santorum and Hoekstra are playing politics with intelligence. This blog has been critical of Congress playing fast-and-loose with intel information in the past, but that doesn’t appear to be the case this time. Santorum and Hoekstra played by the rules, made their requests through proper channels, and only released declassified portions of the document, with the approval of the DNI. Compare that to the antics of Vermont Senator Pat Leahy–who was booted from the Senate intel committee for leaking classified information–and you’ll see that Santorum and Hoekstra were models of patience and decorum.

    Kudos to the NGIC team for publishing this discovery, and to the members of Congress–Santorum, Hoekstra (and Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon)–who pushed for its public release. Our elected officials should demand answers on why this important data never made its way up the chain of command, and why their requests for information were apparently stone-walled by the Pentagon and the intel community.

    Source : In from the cold